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The current research examined the impact that nondiagnostic individuating 
information has on the consistency between subjects’ attitudes toward a group 
and their behavioral intentions toward individual group members. Consistent with 
predictions, nondiagnostic individuating information reduced the consistency be- 
tween subjects’ intentions to vote for a political candidate and their attitudes 
toward the candidate’s political party to a greater degree if the information was 
relatively high in typical diagnosticity (i.e., useful across many social judgment 
and behavioral tasks) than if it was relatively low in typical diagnosticity (i.e., 
useful across few social judgment and behavioral tasks). In addition, the infor- 
mation that was relatively high in typical diagnosticity reduced the perceived 
representativeness of the party member more than did the information that was 
low in typical diagnosticity. Moreover, the effect that individuating information 
had on the representativeness of the party member was correlated significantly 
with the impact that the information had on the consistency between subjects’ 
attitudes toward the party and their voting intentions regarding the party member. 
The implications of these findings are discussed. GJ 1~ Academic PBS. inc. 
INTRODUCTION 
Attitudes toward a particular group do not always predict attitudes and 
behaviors toward individual members of that group. Someone who is 
favorably disposed toward Democrats may fail to vote for a particular 
Democrat in a given election; someone who has a generally negative 
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opinion of lawyers may become good friends with a particular attorney; 
someone who usually respects and enjoys his or her students may dodge 
appointments with particular students. In explaining inconsistencies of this 
sort, Lord and his colleagues (Fein & Lord, 1987; Lord, Lepper, & 
Mackie, 1984) have suggested that when people are asked about their 
attitudes toward a group they base their attitudes on the prototype they 
hold of the group. In reacting to an individual member of the group, 
however, they take into account information that is available about the 
person and then respond to the match between the individual and their 
prototype of the typical group member. A strong match results in high 
consistency between their attitudes toward the group and their reactions 
to the individual group member, whereas a poor match results in low 
consistency. 
In line with this logic, Lord and colleagues have repeatedly found that 
subjects exhibit greater consistency between their attitudes toward the 
target’s group and their behavioral intentions toward the individual mem- 
bers of the group when the group members match the subjects’ images 
of the typical group member than when the group members are incon- 
sistent with their images of the typical group member. Similarly, Ellsworth 
and her colleagues (e.g., Ellsworth, 1978; Ellsworth & Ross, 1983) found 
that when proponents of capital punishment were confronted with a mass 
murderer who was inconsistent with their image of the typical murderer, 
they were quite hesitant to recommend the death penalty. 
But why do variations in the typicality of a group member affect the 
degree to which people’s responses toward the group member reflect their 
attitudes toward the group? A goal of the present paper is to make a 
distinction, both theoretically and empirically, between two explanations 
of these findings that frequently have been confused in the literature. One 
explanation focuses on the diagnostic implications of the information that 
is available about the individual group members, while the other focuses 
on the effects of the individuating information on the perceived repre- 
sentativeness of the individual group members. 
Diagnosticity and Representativeness 
One possibility is that people simply respond to whatever information 
is available about the group and the individual group member that is 
diagnostic for their attitudes and behavioral intentions. According to this 
account, when people are asked about their attitudes toward a particular 
group, they may construct an image of the group and respond to the 
features contained in the image that are diagnostic for their attitudes. 
When they are confronted with an individual member of the group, how- 
ever, they may respond to whatever diagnostic information is available 
about the individual. For example, when people are asked about their 
attitudes toward a particular group, they may base their attitudes on the 
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image of the group that they construct. If the features of the image include 
intelligent, attractive, and witty, their attitudes toward the group will 
presumably be quite favorable. If, on the other hand, the features of the 
image include dull, unattractive, and boring, their attitudes will presum- 
ably be unfavorable. When confronted with an individual member of the 
group, however, people may respond primarily on the basis of the di- 
agnostic information that is available about the individual rather than on 
his or her group membership. If the individual is described as intelligent, 
attractive, and witty, for example, they will respond favorably. On the 
other hand, if the individual is described as dull, unattractive, and boring, 
they will respond unfavorably. And, if the individual is described as in- 
telligent, unattractive, and moderately witty, they will respond somewhere 
in between. According to this account, then, inconsistency emerges when- 
ever information that is diagnostic for attitudes and behavioral intent 
varies between the group and the individual. 
A second possibility, however, is that people may also respond to the 
representativeness (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) of the individual group 
member, independent of the diagnostic value that any information might 
have for attitudes or behavioral intentions. According to this account, 
when people perceive a group member to be very representative of his 
or her group, their attitudes toward the group will strongly influence their 
behavioral intentions toward the group member. When, on the other hand, 
they perceive the individual to be unrepresentative of the group, their 
attitudes toward the group will exert less influence on their behavioral 
intentions because the individual is not perceived as providing a good fit 
with the category. Thus, according to this account, inconsistency should 
emerge whenever information is available that reduces the representa- 
tiveness of the individual group member. 
In most situations, the diagnosticity account and the representativeness 
account go hand in hand because information that is diagnostic with regard 
to attitudes and behavioral intentions is also information that is likely to 
affect the representativeness of the individual group member. For ex- 
ample, consider the Lord et al. (1984) studies. In their studies, Lord et 
al. measured subjects’ attitudes toward particular groups and their rep- 
resentations of the typical member of these groups before presenting them 
with information about a particular group member. The information that 
some of the subjects received was designed to match their images of the 
typical member of the group on several dimensions, whereas the infor- 
mation that other subjects received was designed to match their images 
of the typical group member on some dimensions but also to contradict 
their images on several other dimensions. What is critical about this ma- 
nipulation with regard to the representativeness and diagnosticity accounts 
is that reductions in typicality were accomplished by contradicting features 
of the prototype that were also likely to be highly diagnostic for attitude 
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and behavioral intent. More generally, in most situations the represent- 
ativeness argument and the diagnosticity argument make similar predic- 
tions regarding consistency between attitudes toward a group and behav- 
ioral intentions toward individual group members because information 
that is diagnostic with regard to behavioral intent is also information that 
is likely to affect the representativeness of the group member. Neverthe- 
less, the two accounts implicate distinct, though not mutually exclusive, 
processes. According to the representativeness account, people use the 
perceived representativeness of the individual member of the group as a 
guide to whether information about the group applies to the individual 
group member. Thus, anything that reduces the representativeness of an 
individual should reduce the consistency between people’s attitudes toward 
the individual’s group and their behavioral intentions toward the individual 
because it suggests that attitudes toward the group may not be good 
predictors for this individual. In contrast, the diagnosticity account simply 
maintains that people base both their attitudes and their behavioral in- 
tentions on whatever diagnostic information is available at the time that 
their attitudes or their behavioral intentions are assessed. 
Although the diagnosticity and the representativeness accounts often 
have indistinguishable implications, under certain conditions they make 
importantly different predictions regarding the consistency between atti- 
tudes toward groups and responses to specific group members. Imagine, 
for example, that an individual is attempting to decide whether or not to 
make an appointment with a particular doctor. When this person thinks 
of the typical doctor, he envisions someone who is very intelligent and 
caring, is well educated, wears eye glasses, has white hair, and is of average 
height. Moreover, in responding to this image, the person forms a gen- 
erally positive attitude toward doctors and believes that most of them will 
help him when he is sick. Imagine further that he happens to observe the 
doctor in question, and he notices that the doctor obtained his medical 
degree from a second-rate medical school located in the Caribbean. In 
this case, both the diagnosticity argument and the representativeness ar- 
gument would predict little consistency between the individual’s attitude 
toward physicians and his intention to see this particular physician. After 
all, the information about the doctor’s medical training is diagnostic with 
regard to behavioral intent and it also renders the physician less repre- 
sentative of physicians in general. 
But now imagine that instead of learning about the doctor’s medical 
training, the individual simply notices that the doctor is unusually tall and 
completely bald. In other words, he notices that the doctor’s height and 
hair do not fit his image of the typical doctor. Because this information 
has little to do with diagnosing the doctor’s competence, the diagnosticity 
account would predict that it would have little effect on the consistency 
between the individual’s attitude toward doctors and his decision about 
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visiting this doctor. In contrast, the representativeness account would 
predict that this information should lead to greater inconsistency between 
the patient’s generally positive attitude toward doctors and his decision 
to visit this doctor because it reduces the representativeness of the doctor. 
The problem, of course, is finding a way to manipulate independently 
the representativeness of the individual and the diagnosticity of the in- 
dividuating information. Recent research on the dilution effect (Hilton & 
Fein, 1989) suggests one such manipulation. 
The Dilution Effect ahd Typical Diagnostic@ 
Research on the dilution effect has consistently demonstrated that the 
presence of individuating information about a group member that is non- 
diagnostic for the judgment task at hand can significantly dilute the impact 
that perceivers’ stereotypes have on their judgments of the group member 
(Hilton & Fein, 1989; Nisbett, Zukier, & Lemley, 1981; Zukier, 1982; 
Zukier & Jennings, 1984; but see also Heilman, 1984). Nisbett et al. 
(1981), for example, found that in the absence of individuating infor- 
mation, subjects expected an engineering student to withstand higher 
intensities of electrical shock than a music major. When, however, the 
subjects learned individuating information that was nondiagnostic for the 
judgment of shock tolerance (e.g., that the target was Catholic), the 
difference in predicted shock tolerance was attenuated significantly. 
Recently, Hilton and Fein (1989) extended these results and argued 
that not all information that is nondiagnostic for a particular judgment 
should have a diluting effect. They maintained that individuating infor- 
mation varies on two dimensions: the dimension of judgment-specific 
diagnosticity and the dimension of typical diagnosticity. Judgment-specific 
diagnosticity refers to the extent to which the information is perceived to 
be diagnostic for the judgment task at hand. Typical diagnosticity, on the 
other hand, refers to the extent to which the information is perceived to 
be generally useful across social judgment tasks. For example, if one is 
trying to decide how health-conscious some target is, information about 
the target’s relationship with his or her parents will be rather low in 
judgment-specific diagnosticity, but, because it is perceived to be useful 
for many other social judgment tasks, the information will be high in 
typical diagnosticity. Information about what the target just ate for lunch, 
on the other hand, will be high in judgment-specific diagnosticity, but it 
will be rather low in typical diagnosticity. After all, finding out information 
about one’s lunch menu will be perceived to be useful in relatively few 
judgment tasks. Information that the target bought a notebook before 
going to his or her first class will be low in both judgment-specific di- 
agnosticity and in typical diagnosticity. Hilton and Fein (1989) referred 
to individuating information that is perceived to be low in judgment- 
specific diagnosticity and relatively high in typical diagnosticity as pseudo- 
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relevant information, and referred to individuating information that is 
perceived to be low in judgment-specific diagnosticity and low in typical 
diagnosticity as clearfy irrelevant information. (For a more complete dis- 
cussion of the differences between pseudorelevant and clearly irrelevant 
information and of factors that contribute to perceived typical diagnos- 
ticity, see Hilton and Fein, 1989.) 
In three separate studies, Hilton and Fein (1989) found that although 
clearly irrelevant information had very little power to dilute the impact 
that perceivers’ stereotypes about the group had on their judgments of 
individual group members, pseudorelevant information consistently di- 
luted the impact of the perceivers’ stereotypes about the group. In ex- 
plaining this result, Hilton and Fein proposed that pseudorelevant infor- 
mation has its stronger diluting power because it reduces the perceived 
representativeness of the target for his or her group more than does clearly 
irrelevant information. Specifically, we argued that because pseudorele- 
vant information is relatively high in typical diagnosticity, it suggests mean- 
ingful features about the target that are not represented in perceivers’ 
cognitive representations of the typical group member, and thus the match 
between the target and the target’s group should be reduced. To the 
extent that the fit between the target and the target’s group is poor, 
perceivers rely more on the information that they have about the individual 
and less on the information they have about the group when making 
inferences about the group member. 
Manipulating Typical Diagnostic@ to Test the 
Representativeness Account 
Although Nisbett et al. (1981), Zukier (1982), and Hilton and Fein 
(1989) all have offered representativeness as an account for their results, 
they did not examine directly the effects that nondiagnostic information 
has on representativeness. Nevertheless, if pseudorelevant information 
reduces the representativeness of the group member more than does 
clearly irrelevant information, the presence of pseudorelevant information 
should cause subjects to rely significantly less on their attitudes toward 
the group in deciding how to behave toward the group member than 
should the presence of clearly irrelevant information. 
The present study was designed to investigate these issues. In contrast 
to the studies of Lord and his colleagues (e.g., Lord et al., 1984), the 
individuating information used in the present study (1) was perceived to 
be nondiagnostic for the behavioral intent in question and (2) did not 
match nor contradict the features typically associated with the individual’s 
group. By satisfying these criteria we hoped to offer the most stringent 
test of the representativeness argument and also to demonstrate the impact 
that nondiagnostic individuating information about a group member has 
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on the consistency between subjects’ attitudes toward the group and their 
behavioral intentions toward the group member. 
To these ends, subjects who were either Democrats or Republicans 
learned either pseudorelevant or clearly irrelevant information about 
either a Democratic or a Republican candidate. We chose to focus on 
subjects’ voting intentions for particular political candidates for two rea- 
sons. First, voting intentions can be predicted quite well from people’s 
attitudes, and voting behavior can be predicted quite well from voting 
intentions (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Fishbein, Middlestadt, & Chung, 
1986). Second, because we asked some subjects about candidates who 
were members of the political party they favored and other subjects about 
candidates who were members of the political party they were against, it 
was possible to examine the impact that nondiagnostic information has 
when the initial attitude toward the group is positive and when it is 
negative. 
We predicted that the presence of pseudorelevant information would 
reduce the representativeness of the candidate more than would the pres- 
ence of clearly irrelevant information, and that subjects who received the 
former information would be likely to rely less on their attitudes toward 
the candidate’s political party and more on the individuating information 
when deciding whether or not to vote for him. This greater reliance on 
the nondiagnostic individuating information should result in two processes. 
Some subjects may simply determine that, because the individuated can- 
didate seems unrepresentative of his party and because the individuating 
information is low in judgment-specific diagnosticity, neither their attitude 
toward the candidate’s party nor the individuating information seems 
relevant for their decision about voting for the candidate in question. To 
the extent that this is true, the voting intentions of these subjects should 
move toward the neutral point (i.e., 50-50 preference). 
Other subjects, however, may invest the individuating information with 
diagnostic meaning. To the extent that the information is truly low in 
diagnosticity for the behavioral intention in question, however, any di- 
agnostic meaning that the subjects may infer should vary idiosyncratically 
and not systematically. For some it should make the candidate seem more 
positive and for others it should make him seem more negative. In other 
words, the individuating information should add noise to their behavioral 
intentions. At the individual level, this noise should manifest itself as 
inconsistency between subjects’ behavioral intentions toward the candidate 
and their initial attitudes toward the candidate’s party in both positive 
and negative ways (i.e., some subjects should become more favorable, 
and others less favorable, toward the individuated candidate). At a group 
level, however, given that the subjects were selected because they held 
polarized attitudes toward the political parties, the addition of this noise 
should lead to a process that is analogous to the process involved in 
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regression to the mean. To the extent that this is true, two effects should 
emerge. First, subjects’ voting intentions toward the candidate described 
by pseudorelevant information should, on average, tend to move toward 
the general population mean (i.e., the mean collapsing across political 
parties) and away from their initially extreme attitudes. Second, the cor- 
relations between subjects’ attitudes toward the party and voting intentions 
for the specific candidate should be reduced when the candidate is de- 
scribed by pseudorelevant information. 
In either case, by causing subjects to rely more on the individuating 
information, the presence of pseudorelevant information about a candi- 
date should dilute the impact of the subjects’ attitudes toward the can- 
didate’s group more than should the presence of clearly irrelevant infor- 
mation. Thus, subjects who have favorable attitudes toward the 
candidate’s party should tend to be less willing to vote for him in the 
presence of pseudorelevant information than in the presence of clearly 
irrelevant information, whereas subjects who have unfavorable attitudes 
toward the candidate’s party should tend to be more willing to vote for 
him in the presence of pseudorelevant rather than clearly irrelevant in- 
formation. 
In addition to allowing us to test these predictions, the present design 
also allows us to collapse across political parties in order to examine the 
impact that the individuating information had when it described a member 
of the subjects’ ingroup (i.e., a member of their own party) and when it 
described a member of the subjects’ outgroup (i.e., a member of the other 
major party). Previous research suggests that perceivers tend to have more 
complex and sophisticated cognitive representations of ingroups than of 
outgroups (e.g., Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989; Linville & Jones, 
1980; Mullen & Hu, 1989; Quattrone, 1986). To the extent that this is 
true, and to the extent that individuating information affects the repre- 
sentativeness of the individual group member, individuating information 
should reduce the representativeness of an outgroup member more than 
it should an ingroup member. Subjects confronted with information about 
a candidate from their outgroup, therefore, should exhibit greater incon- 
sistency between their attitudes toward the candidate’s group and their 
voting intentions regarding this candidate than should subjects confronted 
with information about an ingroup candidate. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Subjects were 126 undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology course at the 
University of Michigan who participated in order to fulfill a research requirement. Because 
we wanted subjects who clearly favored either the Democratic or the Republican party, we 
analyzed the data only from subjects who indicated that they considered themselves to be 
either a Democrat or a Republican, and who indicated that they would be more than 50% 
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likely to vote for a candidate of their party for a City Council election if they had to vote 
and if they knew nothing about the candidates other than that one was the Democratic 
candidate and the other was the Republican candidate. On the basis of these criteria, the 
data from 50 Democratic subjects and 50 Republican subjects were included in the analyses 
reported below. 
Design Overview 
Subjects who indicated that they were favorably disposed toward either the Democratic 
or the Republican parties read individuating information about a particular candidate who 
was ostensibly running for political office in some city. For half the subjects, the candidate 
was described as a Democrat, whereas for the other half the candidate was described as a 
Republican. Orthogonal to this manipulation, for half the subjects the individuating infor- 
mation was presented in one of two vignettes containing information that was clearly ir- 
relevant, whereas for the other half the information was presented in one of two vignettes 
containing information that was pseudorelevant. Thus, the present experiment used a 2 
(Democrat vs Republican subject) x 2 (Democrat vs Republican candidate) x 2 (clearly 
irrelevant vs pseudorelevant information) x 2 (vignette 1 vs vignette 2) between-subjects 
factorial design. 
Pretests 
Because the difference between pseudorelevant and clearly irrelevant information is a 
subtle one-representing different points on the continuum of perceived typical diagnos- 
ticity-it was necessary to conduct a series of controls that would ensure that the individuating 
information varied in typical diagnosticity but not in judgment-specific diagnosticity. The 
pseudorelevant and clearly irrelevant vignettes used in the present study, therefore, were 
selected on the basis of a series of pretests that were modeled after, but extended beyond, 
those used by Hilton and Fein (1989) and Nisbett et al. (1981). The pretest subjects were 
84 undergraduate students enrolled at the University of Michigan who were paid three 
dollars for their participation. The first pretest was designed to ensure that the information 
contained in the pseudorelevant vignettes and clearly irrelevant vignettes were both non- 
diagnostic for the task at hand, which, in the present study, was a decision concerning the 
probability of voting for a particular candidate. In this pretest, 24 subjects read vignettes 
about a series of individuals. The subjects were asked to imagine that each of the individuals 
described was running for some local political office, and that in each case the candidates 
were running against one other candidate, about whom the subjects would have no infor- 
mation. For each candidate, the subjects were asked to indicate if the information contained 
in each vignette increased or decreased the probability that they would vote for the candidate, 
or if the information was not helpful at all in making any decisions about voting. Based on 
the criteria used by Nisbett et al. (1981) and Hilton and Fein (1989), we selected for use 
in this study clearly irrelevant and pseudorelevant vignettes only if at least 85% of the 
pretest subjects judged them to be not helpful in making a voting decision, no more than 
10% of the pretest subjects indicated that the vignettes would make them either more or 
less likely to vote for the candidate, and there were no significant differences in the number 
of subjects indicating that the information was not helpful (for the vignettes that were 
eventually used in the experiment, all p’s > .3). 
Most investigators who have incorporated nondiagnostic information in their experimental 
manipulations have controlled for diagnosticity by asking pretest subjects to categorize the 
information according to its diagnostic value (e.g., Krueger & Rothbart, 1988; Locksley, 
Hepburn, & Ortiz, 1982; Nisbett et al., 1981). Because it is critical, however, that pseudorele- 
vant and clearly irrelevant information are both low in perceived judgment-specific diag- 
nosticity, we submitted the vignettes to a second, more conservative, test of judgment- 
specific diagnosticity. In this pretest 18 subjects were given the same information that subjects 
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in the first pretest received, but these subjects were asked to indicate how likely they would 
be to vote for the candidates described by the pseudorelevant and clearly irrelevant vignettes, 
using the same lOl-point scale that subjects in the actual experiment would later use. As 
such, this pretest was used to determine if the information contained in the vignettes would, 
in the absence of information about the person’s group membership, affect the responses 
given by subjects who were faced with a task that resembled quite closely the task that the 
subjects in the actual experiment would face. Clearly irrelevant and pseudorelevant vignettes 
were selected for use in the experiment only if the vignettes led to estimates that were at, 
or very near, the midpoint, and if these estimates did not differ significantly frpm each 
other. The two clearly irrelevant vignettes that were used in this study yielded means of 
52.93 and 50.36, and the two pseudorelevant vignettes yielded means of 51.79 and 51.07 
(all p’s > .3). 
The third pretest was designed to ensure that the pseudorelevant and clearly irrelevant 
vignettes were both perceived to be nondiagnostic for a judgment concerning whether or 
not a particular candidate was likely to be a Republican or Democrat. Eighteen subjects 
read vignettes about a number of candidates, and they were asked to indicate whether they 
thought the vignettes suggested that the individuals described were more likely to be Re- 
publicans, Democrats, or if the vignettes were not at all helpful in deciding the candidates’ 
parties. Pseudorelevant and clearly irrelevant vignettes were selected for use in this exper- 
iment only if at least 85% of the pretest subjects indicated that they felt that the vignettes 
were not helpful for this judgment, no more than 10% felt that the vignettes suggested that 
the people described were either more or less likely to be a member of one of the parties, 
and there were no significant differences in the number of subjects indicating that the 
information was not helpful (all p’s > .5). 
The final pretest was designed to allow us to categorize the vignettes as either pseudorele- 
vant or clearly irrelevant on the basis of the degree to which the information contained in 
the vignettes was perceived to be typically diagnostic. Twenty-four subjects participated in 
this pretest. These subjects were asked to read the vignettes and use a nine-point scale to 
indicate how useful the information contained in each vignette was for most social judgments. 
Any vignette that we had intended to be pseudorelevant but that was not rated as significantly 
more useful than the clearly irrelevant vignettes, and any vignette that we had intended to 
be clearly irrelevant but that was not rated as significantly less useful than the pseudorelevant 
vignettes, were not used in this experiment. The two clearly irrelevant vignettes that were 
used in this study yielded means of 2.96 and 2.85, and the two pseudorelevant vignettes 
yielded means of 4.00 and 3.86 (all p’s < .03). 
Procedure 
Subjects were run in small groups. They were told that the current study was concerned 
with issues about politics and political campaigns and that they would be asked to play the 
role of voters in some city. The subjects were each given a booklet that contained all the 
instructions and experimental materials. The subjects’ first task was to read two identical 
lists of 50 traits and to select from one of the lists those traits that they felt characterized 
the typical Democratic politician and to select from the other list those traits that they felt 
characterized the typical Republican politician. The order in which the politicians were 
characterized was counterbalanced across subjects. The traits that were included on the lists 
were chosen because they varied in terms of how evaluatively positive or negative they were 
(Anderson, 1968) and because they varied in terms of how consistent they seemed to be 
with stereotypes of American liberals and conservatives. 
After completing these checklists, subjects indicated whether they considered themselves 
to be a “Democrat,” “Republican, ” “Independent,” or “Other.” They then read information 
which asked them to imagine that they were about to vote in an election for their City 
Council, and that they knew absolutely nothing about either of the two candidates except 
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that one of them was the Democratic candidate and that the other was the Republican 
candidate. The subjects were then asked what the probability was, assuming that they had 
to vote for someone, that they would vote for the Democratic candidate, and what the 
probability was that they would vote for the Republican candidate. 
The subjects next read the cover story and instructions for the rest of the experiment. 
The cover story indicated that the primary concern of the study was to investigate how 
people’s attitudes about political candidates change or stay the same over the course of a 
political campaign. The cover story also indicated that while some of the information that 
people learn about candidates is important and meaningful, other information is irrelevant 
and extraneous. Moreover, it indicated that the goal of the study was to track the process 
of learning bits and pieces of information and to see how voting intentions may or may not 
change as a function of this increased knowledge. To this end, the cover story asked the 
subjects to imagine that they were voters in several cities and that they would learn infor- 
mation about several candidates in several cities who were running for seats on the City 
Council. The subjects read further that none of the candidates they would be reading about 
were actually competing against each other. They aiso read that in each of these races there 
were only two candidates-a Democrat and a Republican. 
The subjects then read about how the information that they would be receiving about 
the candidates was ostensibly collected. Specifically, they read that observers were given 
the job of following the candidates and writing down everything they saw or learned about 
the candidates in a diary. The diary was to include minor details as well as major events. 
The subjects read further that the information they would be reading had been selected 
from the diaries the observers kept, and that the particular passages they would be reading 
had been picked at random. The purpose in emphasizing both the instructions to the 
observers to write down even trivial information about the candidates and the randomness 
of the selection process was to encourage subjects to feel free to consider. or ignore, any 
single piece of information they received about a particular candidate. 
After reading the cover story, subjects were given information about the first candidate, 
referred to as “Bill H.” Half the subjects read that Bill H. was a Democrat, and half read 
that he was a Republican. Orthogonally, half the subjects read one of the vignettes containing 
clearly irrelevant information, and half read one of the vignettes containing pseudorelevant 
information. Of the subjects who read clearly irrelevant information, half read a vignette 
that described the details of the candidate’s schedule for a particular day, which included 
making a speech at a fund raiser. The other half read a vignette that described the candidate 
as having come from a family that included a brother named Jeff, a sister named Linda, 
and a dog named Boomer. Of the subjects who read pseudorelevant information, half read 
a vignette that described the candidate’s response to a reporter’s question concerning whether 
the candidate kept in touch with his old friends as one in which he indicated that he was 
still close with only a few of his old friends, and that whenever he thought about his high 
school friends he remembered one of his best friends, who was killed in an automobile 
accident. The other half read a vignette that described a 50th wedding anniversary party 
that the candidate, his two sisters, and his brother, threw for their parents, and the six-day 
Caribbean cruise that the four children gave to their parents as an anniversary present. 
Dependent Measures 
After reading the individuating information about the candidate, subjects were asked how 
likely they would be to vote for him, rather than the Republican (Democratic) candidate 
who was running against him. Subjects wrote in a percentage that ranged from 0 to 100%. 
The subjects next received a list of 50 traits that was identical to the two lists that they had 
completed earlier. This time, however, they were instructed to select all those traits that 
they felt characterized the candidate. After completing this task, subjects were asked the 
degree to which they thought the candidate was like the typical, or average, Democrat 
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(Republican). Their responses were measured on a nine-point scale ranging from “not at 
all like the typical Democrat (Republican)” to “very much like the typical Democrat (Re- 
publican).” 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Initial Attitudes toward the Two Political Parties 
In response to the question asking them how likely they would be to 
vote for either the Democratic candidate or the Republican candidate, if 
that were the only information they had at the time, Democratic subjects, 
on average, indicated that there would be a 79.58% probability that they 
would vote for the Democratic candidate, and Republican subjects, on 
average, indicated that there would be an 83.89% chance that they would 
vote for the Republican candidate. 
Intentions to Vote for the Candidate 
An analysis of the effects of the particular pseudorelevant and clearly 
irrelevant vignettes that subjects received did not reveal any significant 
differences. Accordingly, the data were collapsed separately across the 
two vignettes containing clearly irrelevant information and the two vi- 
gnettes containing pseudorelevant information. 
The primary hypothesis of the study was that pseudorelevant infor- 
mation would lead to greater inconsistency than would clearly irrelevant 
information. To test this hypothesis, subjects’ responses to the question 
concerning their likelihood of voting for the candidate were subjected to 
a 2 (Democrat vs Republican subject) x 2 (Democrat vs Republican 
candidate) x 2 (clearly irrelevant vs pseudorelevant individuating infor- 
mation) analysis of variance (ANOVA). As expected, a significant inter- 
action between the subjects’ party and the candidate’s party emerged, 
indicating that Democrats were more likely to vote for the candidate if 
he was a Democrat, whereas Republicans were more likely to vote for 
the candidate if he was a Republican, F(1, 92) = 109.10, p < .OOl. More 
importantly, a three-way interaction emerged, indicating that this effect 
was attenuated by the presence of pseudorelevant information, F(1,92) = 
5.06, p < .03. As can be seen in Fig. 1, this interaction suggests that in 
the presence of pseudorelevant information, relative to clearly irrelevant 
information, Democratic subjects tended to become more favorable to- 
ward a Republican candidate and less favorable toward a Democratic 
candidate, while the opposite was true of Republican subjects. 
No other main or interactive effects emerged, although there was a 
marginally significant main effect for the candidate’s party, F(1, 92) = 
3.00, p < .09, indicating that subjects tended to be more likely to vote 
for the candidate if he was the Republican candidate (M = 56.70) than 
if he was the Democratic candidate (M = 50.58). 
A second way to examine consistency is to look at the correlation 
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FIG. 1. Probability of voting for the candidate as a function of the subject’s political 
party identification, the candidate’s political party identification, and whether the candidate 
was described by clearly irrelevant or pseudorelevant information. 
between subjects’ attitudes toward voting for members of the candidate’s 
party and their intentions to vote for a candidate described by pseudorele- 
vant versus clearly irrelevant information. Consistent with predictions, the 
correlation between the subjects’ attitudes toward the candidate’s party 
and their intentions to vote for the candidate was significantly higher for 
subjects who received clearly irrelevant information about the candidate 
(r = .90) than it was for subjects who received pseudorelevant information 
(r = JO), z = 1.87, p < .03, one-tailed. 
Although the results from the previous analyses support the hypothesis 
that pseudorelevant information will lead to greater inconsistency than 
will clearly irrelevant information, we have yet to examine the effects that 
individuating information has as a function of the ingroup versus outgroup 
status of the candidate. Recall that we predicted that, due to the relatively 
impoverished representations of outgroups, the presence of any indivi- 
duating information would have greater impact on consistency when the 
individuating information described an outgroup member than when it 
described an ingroup member. In order to examine this issue, the can- 
didate’s party affiliation was recoded as identical to the subjects’ party 
affiliation (i.e., ingroup) or opposite to the subjects’ party affiliation (i.e., 
outgroup). Moreover, in order to obtain a more precise measure of the 
degree to which subjects’ voting intentions toward the candidate were 
inconsistent with their attitudes toward the candidate’s party, we calcu- 
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FIG. 2. Magnitude of inconsistency as a function of whether clearly irrelevant or pseu- 
dorelevant information described the candidate and whether the candidate was a member 
of the subject’s ingroup or outgroup. (Higher numbers indicate greater inconsistency between 
intention to vote for individuated candidate and attitude about voting for candidate’s party.) 
lated a difference score for each subject by taking the difference between 
each subject’s stated likelihood of voting for the individuated candidate 
and his or her stated likelihood of voting for a member of the candidate’s 
party in the abstract (i.e., before learning any individuating information). 
Then, because subjects could manifest inconsistency either by becoming 
more extreme in the direction of their original attitudes or by becoming 
more extreme in the direction opposite of their original attitudes we took 
the absolute value of the difference score. Thus, higher numbers on the 
difference score indicate greater inconsistency. The difference scores were 
then subjected to a 2 (ingroup vs outgroup candidate) x 2 (clearly ir- 
relevant vs pseudorelevant) ANOVA. 
Consistent with the prediction that pseudorelevant information leads 
to greater inconsistency than does clearly irrelevant information, a sig- 
nificant effect for the nature of the individuating information emerged, 
F(1, 96) = 5.92, p < .02. As can be seen in Fig. 2, subjects’ voting 
intentions concerning the candidate differed from their attitudes toward 
the candidate’s party to a significantly greater degree if they learned 
pseudorelevant information about the candidate (M = 15.18) than if they 
learned clearly irrelevant information (M = 9.33). A significant effect for 
the group manipulation also emerged, F( 1,96) = 4.37, p < .04. Consistent 
with the prediction that individuating information leads to greater incon- 
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sistency when the individuating information describes an outgroup mem- 
ber than when it describes an ingroup member, greater inconsistency 
emerged when the individuating information described a member of the 
other political party (M = 15.00) than when it described a member of 
the subjects’ own parties (M = 10.20). The interaction between the type 
of information and the group status of the candidate was not significant, 
F(1,96) < 1. 
Typical Diagnosticity and Representativeness 
The results reported thus far demonstrate that individuating information 
has a greater effect when it applies to members of the outgroup than 
when it applies to members of the ingroup, and that pseudorelevant 
information leads to greater inconsistency between subjects’ attitudes to- 
ward a political party and their voting intentions regarding a party member 
than does clearly irrelevant information. The results do not, however, 
address the issue of how these effects are mediated. Recall that both 
effects are thought to emerge because individuating information, partic- 
ularly individuating information high in typical diagnosticity (i.e., pseudo- 
relevant information), affects the representativeness of the individual to 
whom it applies. The next two analyses were designed to examine this 
issue. 
Two measures of the degree to which the candidate seemed repre- 
sentative of his group were included in the study. The more direct measure 
consisted of the subjects’ responses to the question of how similar the 
candidate seemed to be to the typical member of his party. Their responses 
to this question were subjected to the 2 (ingroup vs outgroup) x 2 (clearly 
irrelevant vs pseudorelevant information) ANOVA. Consistent with pre- 
dictions, a main effect for the type of individuating information emerged, 
indicating that when the candidate was described by pseudorelevant in- 
formation he was seen as less similar to the typical party member (M = 
5.55) than when he was described by clearly irrelevant information (M = 
6.09), F(1, 96) = 7.23, p < .Ol. In addition, the predicted main effect 
for group status emerged, indicating that, when the individuated candidate 
was described as a member of the subjects’ outgroup, he was seen as less 
similar to the typical party member (M = 5.22) than when he was de- 
scribed as a member of the subjects’ ingroup (M = 6.33), F(1, 96) = 
21.99, p < .OOl. The interaction between group status and typical diag- 
nosticity did not approach significance, F( 1, 96) < 1. 
A second measure of the representativeness of the candidate consists 
of the comparison between the traits subjects endorsed as characteristic 
of the candidate and the traits they endorsed as characteristic of the typical 
member of the candidate’s party. A change score was calculated for each 
subject by adding a point for every trait that he or she endorsed on one 
list but not the other. These scores were then subjected to the 2 x 2 
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ANOVA. Consistent with predictions, a main effect for the type of in- 
formation again emerged, F(1, 96) = 5.81, p < .02. Subjects made more 
changes between their lists when they learned pseudorelevant information 
about the candidate (M = 12.49) than when they learned clearly irrelevant 
information (M = 9.82). The main effect for group status, however, did 
not emerge, F(1, 96) = 2.51, p > .ll, although the means were in the 
predicted direction (M,,,,,, = 12.08 vs Mingroup = 10.53). Once again, 
there was no interaction between group status and information type, 
F< 1. 
Relationship between Representativeness and Inconsistency 
Although the previous analyses indicate that the presence of pseudorele- 
vant information reduces the perceived representativeness of the indivi- 
duated group member, they do not address the issue concerning the 
relationship between representativeness and the inconsistency between 
subjects’ attitudes toward the political party and their voting intentions 
regarding the specific party member. To address this issue, the correlation 
between the subjects’ ratings of how similar the candidate seemed to the 
typical member of the candidate’s party and the degree of observed in- 
consistency, as measured by the difference score, was calculated. Con- 
sistent with predictions, the correlation between the two measures was 
negative, ~(98) = - .32, p < .OOl, indicating that greater similarity was 
associated with less inconsistency. 
Conceptually similar results emerged when the trait change scores were 
correlated with the degree of observed inconsistency. Here, the correlation 
was positive, r(98) = .27, p < .Ol, indicating that greater discrepancy 
between the subjects’ trait checklists for the candidate and for the typical 
member of the candidate’s party was associated with greater inconsistency 
between subjects’ attitudes toward the political party and their intentions 
to vote for the party member. 
General Impressions of the Candidate and the Typical Members of the 
Parties 
Although we included the trait checklist primarily to provide us with 
a second measure of representativeness, we were also able to use this 
checklist to begin exploring the effects of individuating information on 
the impressions subjects formed of the candidate. To investigate this issue 
we weighted each trait on the checklist by the favorability scores reported 
in Anderson (1968). For each subject we recorded the average favorability 
of each trait that they endorsed for the typical member of their own party, 
for the typical member of the other party, and for the specific candidate. 
Not surprisingly, subjects’ impressions of the typical member of their own 
party were much more favorable (M = 403.05) than were their impressions 
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of the typical member of the other party (M = 342.80), F(1,93) = 18.67, 
p < .OOl. 
To assess the effect of the individuating information on subjects’ impres- 
sions of the specific candidate, we calculated a difference score by sub- 
tracting the average favorability of the set of traits endorsed by each 
subject in regard to the typical member of the candidate’s party from the 
average favorability of the set of traits he or she endorsed in regard to 
the candidate. Positive numbers for this score indicate that the set of 
traits endorsed by the subject to describe the individuated candidate was 
more favorable than was the set of traits the subjects endorsed to describe 
the typical member of the candidate’s party. These difference scores were 
subjected to the 2 x 2 ANOVA. The ANOVA revealed a marginally 
significant main effect for the group status, F(1, 93) = 3.22, p < .08, 
indicating that individuating information tended to have more of a positive 
effect on the outgroup candidate (M = 85.97) than it did on the ingroup 
candidate (M = 61.51). The ANOVA also revealed a significant main 
effect for the type of information, indicating that pseudorelevant infor- 
mation tended to have more of a positive effect on the impressions of 
the candidate (M = 88.08) than did clearly irrelevant information (M = 
56.02), F(1, 93) = 18.67, p < .OOl. The interaction between these two 
independent variables was not significant, F < 1. 
These results are quite consistent with research on the person positivity 
bias. Sears (1983), for example, argues that people tend to be more willing 
to take a harsh stand toward abstract institutions than toward an indi- 
vidual. Consistent with this account, the favorability scores of the endorsed 
traits in the present study tended to be much higher, independent of the 
particular type of individuating information present, for the individuated 
candidate than for the abstract “typical” member of either party. Second, 
both the main effect for group status and the main effect for the type of 
individuating information suggest that the more the information indivi- 
duated the candidate, the more favorable were the sets of traits that 
subjects selected to describe him. That is, the presence of individuating 
information should have more of an individuating effect on outgroup 
members than on ingroup members, and the presence of pseudorelevant 
information should have more of an individuating effect on group members 
than should clearly irrelevant information. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The results from the current research suggest that representativeness 
is an important factor in determining the degree to which people’s be- 
havioral intentions toward a group member will be consistent with their 
attitudes toward the group. The presence of pseudorelevant information 
about a political candidate reduced the correspondence between the sub- 
jects’ attitudes toward the candidate’s political party and their voting 
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intentions regarding the candidate more than did the presence of clearly 
irrelevant information. Moreover, pseudorelevant information reduced 
the perceived representativeness of the candidate significantly more than 
did clearly irrelevant information, and representativeness was, in turn, 
correlated with the degree to which subjects’ voting intentions toward the 
candidates diverged from their attitudes toward the candidates’ parties. 
As such, the results suggest that as the representativeness of the individual 
group member increases, so too does the consistency between attitudes 
toward a group and behavioral intentions toward specific group members. 
At a broader level, the results of the current research support the 
emphasis that Lord and his colleagues (Fein & Lord, 1987; Lord et al., 
1984) and Ellsworth (1978) have placed on the typicality of the attitude 
object. Recall that they have found that when individuating information 
contradicts the image that perceivers have of the typical group member, 
the consistency between their attitudes toward the group and their be- 
havioral intentions toward individual group members is reduced. The 
present results also support recent work by Glick, Zion, and Nelson 
(1988). Glick et al. found that manipulations of the representativeness of 
individual group members affected subjects’ trait inferences and behav- 
ioral intentions concerning the individuals. The present research extends 
the work of these investigators to include situations in which the indivi- 
duating information neither confirms nor contradicts the perceivers’ im- 
ages of the typical group member but instead suggests features about the 
individual that are not contained in their images of the group. In other 
words, the present research demonstrates that even subtle changes in 
representativeness can affect the consistency subjects exhibit between their 
responses to a specific group member and their attitudes toward the group. 
Moreover, by manipulating representativeness while holding constant 
the diagnosticity of the information for behavioral intent, the present 
research is the first to distinguish between arguments that focus on the 
role of representativeness in determining the degree of consistency be- 
tween attitudes toward groups and behavioral intentions toward individual 
group members, and arguments that focus on the role of perceived di- 
agnosticity in determining the degree of consistency. The presence of 
pseudorelevant information reduced the representativeness of a group 
member more than did the presence of clearly irrelevant information. 
Consistent with the representativeness account, but not with the diag- 
nosticity account, the presence of the former information led to greater 
inconsistency between subjects’ behavioral intentions toward the group 
member and their attitudes toward the group, despite the fact that the 
pseudorelevant and clearly irrelevant information were both nondiagnostic 
for the behavioral intention in question. These results demonstrate that 
the representativeness of a group member can affect consistency inde- 
pendently of diagnosticity. 
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In addition to demonstrating that pseudorelevant information leads to 
less consistency than does clearly irrelevant information, the results from 
this study also suggest that any individuating information will have greater 
impact when the individual described by the information is a member of 
a person’s outgroup than when she or he is a member of a person’s 
ingroup. Recall that individuating information reduced both the perceived 
representativeness of the candidate and the consistency between subjects’ 
attitudes toward the candidate’s group and their behavioral intentions 
toward the candidate more when the candidate was a member of the 
subject’s outgroup than when he was a member of the subject’s ingroup. 
Taken together, these findings are consistent with research that has shown 
that individuals tend to have more complex representations of ingroups 
than they do of outgroups, and that these differences mediate their re- 
actions to group members. It is worth noting, however, that another 
process may also be at work. Specifically, because subjects favor their 
ingroup relative to their outgroup, their behavioral intentions regarding 
outgroup members may be more affected by individuating information 
because people prefer to deviate from initially negative attitudes than 
from initially positive attitudes (cf. Newcomb, 1961). Because our ma- 
nipulation of ingroup/outgroup status confounds group status with initial 
favorability, it is not possible to determine how much each of these pro- 
cesses contributed to the ingroup/outgroup differences we observed. At 
a deeper level, however, to the extent that differences between the ingroup 
and the outgroup always involve differences between both representational 
complexity and initial favorability, both processes are likely to be at work 
whenever perceivers learn individuating information about ingroup and 
outgroup members. 
The Paradoxical Effects of Nondiagnostic Information 
In addition to its implications for issues concerning attitudes and be- 
havioral intentions, the current research is also relevant to work on the 
dilution effect (e.g., Hilton & Fein, 1989; Nisbett et al., 1981; Zukier, 
1982). The results of this study provide strong support for the hypotheses 
offered by these researchers concerning the role of representativeness in 
mediating the dilution effect. Specifically, the current research demon- 
strates that the presence of nondiagnostic individuating information about 
a group member can reduce the representativeness of the group member, 
particularly if the information is relatively high on the dimension of typical 
diagnosticity. 
It is important to address the fact that the results of the present study, 
like the results of the studies that have demonstrated the dilution effect, 
may seem paradoxical. The paradox is that information that is perceived 
by most pretest subjects as irrelevant is in fact used by most subjects (cf. 
Zukier, 1982). How can this be explained? Consistent with the arguments 
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put forth in previous research on the dilution effect cited above, we argue 
that nondiagnostic information can have a significant impact because peo- 
ple often rely on similarity judgments (i.e., representativeness) to make 
their inferences and decisions. By suggesting features about a specific 
group member that are not contained in people’s representations of the 
typical group member, nondiagnostic information-particularly pseudorel- 
evant information-reduces the perceived representativeness of the spe- 
cific group member for his or her group. The more this information reduces 
this representativeness, the less will people rely on their attitudes toward 
the group to determine their behavioral intention toward the group mem- 
ber. Thus, although the individuating information is considered by most 
to be irrelevant, it will have an effect on people’s judgments or behaviors 
to the extent that it affects representativeness. When the information has 
no implications for the issue of representativeness, such as when the group 
memberships of the individual are not known, the information will not 
have any significant effects. 
Typical Diagnostic@ and Person Perception 
In addition to its implications for the issues outlined above, the results 
of the present study are also relevant to recent developments in the person 
perception literature. For example, Fiske and her colleagues (Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1990; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986) have proposed that person 
perception begins with perceivers assigning individuals to particular cat- 
egories. If the individuals’ features match the features that are present in 
the perceivers’ schemata concerning the particular categories to which 
they have been assigned, then the perceivers’ responses, both cognitive 
and affective, will be based largely on the perceivers’ knowledge of the 
categories. If the features do not match, however, then the categorizations 
will be unsuccessful and the perceivers’ responses will be based more on 
the individuating information than on their knowledge of the categories. 
The results of the current research suggest that typical diagnosticity may 
play an important role in determining the degree to which the initial 
categorizations are successful. Specifically, if individuating information 
that is high in typical diagnosticity reduces the representativeness of the 
individual, then it should interfere with categorization and lead to cog- 
nitive and affective responses that are based more on the individuating 
information than on the perceivers’ knowledge of the category. If this 
information is high in judgment-specific diagnosticity, perceivers’ re- 
sponses should reflect its diagnostic implications. If, however, this infor- 
mation is low in judgment-specific diagnosticity, its presence should add 
noise and result in regression toward the population mean. 
In addition, the current results are also relevant to recent research by 
Krueger and Rothbart (1988). Krueger and Rothbart found that indivi- 
duating information that was diagnostic of some trait had strong effects 
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on subjects’ judgments of the target’s disposition concerning the trait, 
particularly when the individuating information reflected relatively high 
temporal stability regarding the trait. In light of the distinctions that we 
have drawn, one question that their research raises is what the relation- 
ships are among the dimensions of judgment-specific diagnosticity, typical 
diagnosticity, and temporal stability. Because Krueger and Rothbart found 
that nondiagnostic information had little impact on subjects’ judgments 
of a group member, even when the information was high in temporal 
stability, whereas in the current study and in the study by Hilton and 
Fein (1989) we have found that nondiagnostic information that was rel- 
atively high in typical diagnosticity had a significant impact on subjects’ 
judgments or behavioral intentions, it- is likely that temporal stability and 
typical diagnosticity are independent dimensions. However, because Krue- 
ger and Rothbart (1988) did not manipulate temporal stability in a single 
study, and because we did not measure the temporal stability of the 
individuating information used in the current research, strong conclusions 
about the relationship between typical diagnosticity and temporal stability 
cannot yet be drawn. It remains for future research, then, to examine 
the independent effects that variations in temporal stability, judgment- 
specific diagnosticity, and typical diagnosticity have on person perception 
and attitude-behavior consistency. 
Some Final Implications 
Finally, the results of the present research may have broader impli- 
cations for work on attitudes and attitude-behavior consistency. For ex- 
ample, the representativeness account discussed in the present paper sug- 
gests another reason why attitudes that are formed on the basis of direct 
behavioral experience are more likely to have a stronger impact on be- 
havior than are attitudes that are formed in the absence of direct behav- 
ioral experience (Fazio & Zanna, 1981). Specifically, individuals who have 
had direct experience with a group are likely to have developed more 
sophisticated representations of the group than are individuals who have 
not had direct experience with the group. When these individuals sub- 
sequently encounter individuating information about a particular group 
member, it should be more difficult for this information to affect the 
representativeness of the individuated group member. In other words, the 
more complicated representations formed from direct experience should 
help buffer against the impact that nondiagnostic individuating information 
may have on attitude-behavior consistency. 
In addition, the current research, in conjunction with the work of Lord 
and his colleagues (e.g., Fein & Lord, 1987; Lord et al., 1984), suggests 
that an important factor in determining the degree to which various kinds 
of individuating information should affect attitude-behavior consistency 
is the extent to which a representation of a group or groups is implicated 
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in the relevant attitude. For example, although the current research sug- 
gests that pseudorelevant information may tend to weaken the relationship 
between attitudes and behaviors, it is important to note that this should 
hold true only to the extent that a representation of the group is implicated 
in people’s attitudes. Moreover, the extent to which representation will 
be implicated should depend both on the nature of the attitude issue and 
on the nature of the individual holding the attitude. Some attitudes are 
more likely to implicate specific groups than are others, and some people’s 
attitudes toward a particular issue may be more closely tied to their images 
of a group than are other people’s attitudes toward the issue. Differences 
such as these are likely to play important roles in determining the degree 
to which factors that affect representativeness are likely to affect attitude- 
behavior consistency. 
The present research would also seem to have important implications 
for issues outside the laboratory. For example, by demonstrating that the 
presence of nondiagnostic information can reduce the consistency between 
people’s expressed attitudes and their behavioral intentions toward specific 
group members, this study adds support to other work that has illustrated 
the potential danger of relying too heavily on abstract questionnaires when 
trying to assess attitudes and predict behavior (cf. LaPiere, 1934). For 
example, Ellsworth (1978) and Fein and Lord (1987) found that subjects 
who were quite willing to recommend the death penalty for mass mur- 
derers in the abstract were much less likely to recommend the death 
penalty for mass murderers when some nondiagnostic individuating in- 
formation was available. In an extension of this work, Fein and Hilton 
(1990) found that proponents of capital punishment were significantly less 
likely to recommend the death penalty when pseudorelevant information 
was available about the mass murderer than when clearly irrelevant in- 
formation was available. Findings such as these call into question the 
predictive validity of many kinds of opinion polls and questionnaires: 
when people respond to simple questionnaires they may often respond 
to overly simplistic and abstract representations or symbols. 
At a more general level, the results from the current research may have 
implications for any group member who is trying to reduce the influence 
that people’s negative attitudes toward the group have on their behaviors. 
Because nondiagnostic individuating information reduces the represent- 
ativeness of a group member more when it describes an outgroup member 
than when it describes an ingroup member, the results suggest that re- 
vealing nondiagnostic information about members of an outgroup should 
elicit more favorable behavior toward these members, particularly if the 
nondiagnostic information is high in typical diagnosticity. Candidates who 
are campaigning in front of fellow party members, for example, may be 
better off if they reveal little individuating information about themselves 
and instead emphasize their party identification, but they should want to 
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reveal as much pseudorelevant information as possible about themselves 
when trying to win votes from the opposing party. The seemingly irrelevant 
“sound bites” that have become so prevalent in political campaigns during 
the past several years may, therefore, have significant effects on campaign 
results to the extent that they affect the representativeness of the can- 
didates, thus reducing the impact that more diagnostic information has 
on voting decisions. 
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